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International Terrorism and Statelessness: Revoking the 
Citizenship of ISIL Foreign Fighters 
Shiva Jayaraman 
Abstract 
 
In response to the growing number of foreign fighters joining international terrorist 
organizations such as ISIL, some States are proposing to revoke the nationality of suspected 
terrorists as part of their comprehensive counterterrorism strategies. While domestic legal 
protections surrounding the right to one’s nationality will vary from state to state, there are certain 
international human rights treaties that might prove to be significant legal obstacles to States 
contemplating these plans. This Comment surveys the applicable international treaty law and 
analyzes the legality of these plans under the existing human rights regime. It examines important 
distinctions between the way in which the international law treats an individual with only one 
nationality and an individual with multiple nationalities. It also discusses the extent to which 
international law protects the nationality rights of close family members of suspected terrorists. 
The Comment explores some of the legal advantages and disadvantages of revoking the nationality 
of an individual as part of a state’s counterterrorism strategy. It concludes that States should 
refrain from implementing these plans due to their questionable efficacy and ramifications on 
international law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
On August 19, 2014, the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS, IS, and Daesh),1 which controls a wide 
swath of territory across Iraq and Syria, uploaded a video to YouTube.2 The video 
began with a clip of President Obama announcing U.S. airstrikes against ISIL in 
Iraq and quickly cut to a shot of a masked ISIL fighter standing next to the 
captured journalist James Foley.3 Mr. Foley read a prepared statement to the 
camera—likely written by his abductors.4 At that point, the ISIL fighter, later 
identified as Muhammad Emwazi but known in the media as “Jihadi John,” 
criticized the airstrikes and threatened retaliation against the U.S. The ISIL captors 
then beheaded Mr. Foley.5 
Not only did this video underscore ISIL’s sheer brutality and violence, it also 
demonstrated another frightening reality about the group—its ability to attract 
foreign-born fighters to the organization’s ranks. “Jihadi John” earned his 
moniker because he spoke with a British accent throughout the video.6 American 
and European intelligence services initially suspected that he was a U.K. national.7 
It was later determined that Emwazi was, in fact, a Kuwaiti and U.K. dual citizen.8 
While estimates vary, it is suspected that roughly thirty American and five 
hundred British fighters have joined ISIL.9 Moreover, there are known fighters 
from France, Germany, Australia, Turkey, Jordan, and many other countries.10 
                                                 
1  This group is officially referred to as “ISIL” by the U.S. Department of State and the Obama 
Administration. It is called “ISIS” or “IS,” often interchangeably, by many in the media. I refer to 
the group as “ISIL” as this is the U.S. government’s preferred name for the group. This, however, 
is simply a matter of convention in this Comment and does not reflect any judgments on the part 
of the author. 
2  While most copies of the actual video have been removed from popular streaming websites such 
as YouTube, many major news outlets have summarized its content. See Chelsea J. Carter, Video 
shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley, CNN (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/ 
08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  I use the terms “national” and “citizen” interchangeably. 
8  'Jihadi John' named as Mohammed Emwazi from London, BBC (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-31637090. 
9  See Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS and the Foreign-Fighter Phenomenon, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/isis-and-the-foreign-fighter-
problem/387166/. 
10  See, for example, Jomana Karadsheh et al., How foreign fighters are swelling ISIS ranks in startling numbers, 
CNN (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/meast/isis-numbers/. 
International Terrorism and Statelessness Jayaraman 
Summer 2016 181 
These “foreign fighters” are tremendous security risks for their home countries. 
A foreign national or dual-national might leave his home country and join ISIL in 
Iraq or Syria. He may receive weapons and explosives training and become further 
radicalized. If he carries, for example, a U.K., U.S., or Australian passport, he 
could have a relatively easy time returning to his home country or others.11 The 
risk is, once back home, he will engage in terrorist activity or recruiting on behalf 
of ISIL. 
In response to this security threat, several countries are considering plans that 
would strip suspected terrorists of their nationalities.12 Denationalization 
programs would make it easier for States to keep suspected terrorists from 
returning to their home countries. These plans take different shapes and have a 
variety of consequences. Some States, for example, propose to revoke the 
nationality of suspected terrorists if they are dual-nationals, thus leaving them with 
another nationality.13 Other States are contemplating plans to render suspected 
terrorists stateless by depriving them of their sole nationality.14 One state is even 
considering revoking the nationality of persons associated with that specific 
individual, such as close relatives, including spouses and children.15 Of course, not 
all States are proposing to resort to such measures—the status quo in most States 
                                                 
11  Daniel Byman & Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western 
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 
(Nov. 2014), at 2. 
12  See, for example, Fact check: How does Australia’s plan to strip foreign rights of citizenship compare to other 
nations?, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2015, 1:26 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-11/foreign-
fighters-citizenship-around-the-world/6498920; Hayes Brown, The Hidden Dangers of Ted Cruz’s New 
Anti-ISIS Bill, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 8, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
world/2014/09/08/3564312/the-hidden-dangers-of-ted-cruzs-new-anti-isis-bill/; Gianluca 
Mezzofiore, Norway ‘to Make Citizens Fighting for Isis Stateless’, IB TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/norway-make-citizens-fighting-isis-stateless-1462776; Countries pass 
restrictions to prevent fighting with militants abroad, CIRCA (May 19, 2015, 2:28 AM), 
http://circanews.com/news/laws-against-joining-extremists. 
13  See, for example, Legislative Summary of Bill C-24: An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make 
consequential amendments to other Acts, at 17 PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, http://www.lop. 
parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c24&Parl=41&Ses=2 (last 
updated Jul. 8, 2014). 
14  See, for example, Melanie Gower, Deprivation of British citizenship and withdrawal of passport facilities, 
LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: HOME AFFAIRS SECTION (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn06820.pdf. 
15  Shalailah Medhora, Children may lose Australian citizenship under proposed legislation, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 11, 2015 11:36 PM ), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jun/24/children-
may-lose-australian-citizenship-under-proposed-legislation. 
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involves arresting suspected terrorists under applicable domestic antiterrorism 
laws before departure or upon arrival in their home state.16 
Significant legal obstacles might prevent States from fully implementing 
proposed plans to strip suspected terrorists and their families of citizenship. There 
are, of course, a host of domestic legal issues that will vary from country to 
country. At the same time, various international conventions aimed at reducing 
statelessness and guaranteeing one’s nationality as a fundamental human right may 
prohibit denationalization as a tool of state counterterrorism policy. Existing 
international law on the subject will therefore pose a challenge to States that are 
attempting to revoke the nationality of suspected terrorists to curb potential 
security risks. For example, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) guarantees an individual the right to a nationality and prohibits 
States from arbitrarily revoking it.17 Subsequent treaties also address the issue of 
statelessness. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 
Convention), for example, prohibits a state from revoking the nationality of an 
individual if doing so would render that person stateless.18 There are, however, 
exceptions if the individual acts “in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital 
interests of the State.”19 This Comment will analyze the plans of States to strip 
suspected terrorists of their citizenship in light of this body of international law. 
The Comment will suggest that while there is no ban, per se, on stripping a 
dual-national of one of his nationalities, international law prohibits “arbitrary” 
revocations of nationality.20 While the scope of this protection is unclear, any 
substantive rights created by the prohibition of “arbitrary” revocations would 
pose significant legal issues for countries implementing these plans. Moreover, 
there are related issues regarding a potential “race” among States to denationalize 
an individual and supranational privileges stemming from citizenship. 
In the case of a person with only one nationality, the international legal regime 
is much stricter and prohibits the revocation of citizenship unless certain 
exceptions to the 1961 Convention are satisfied. The current human rights regime 
likely prohibits States from revoking the nationality of a family member or friend 
of a suspected terrorist unless international law provides an independent basis for 
revoking their citizenship. 
                                                 
16  See, for example, Adam Goldman et al., The Islamic State's suspected inroads into America, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/isis-
suspects/. 
17  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), 
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
18  Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, G.A. Res. 896 (IX), 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into 
force Dec. 13 1975). 
19  Id. at art. 8. 
20  UDHR, supra note 17, at art. 15.  
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This Comment ultimately suggests that the benefits of these plans, from a 
counterterrorism perspective, must be weighed against the potential legal and 
normative consequences. It argues that denationalization plans are detrimental to 
state interests and international law. Therefore, States should not allow such 
proposed policies to come to fruition. 
Section II of this Comment briefly discusses the rise of ISIL, highlights some 
of the emerging security issues faced by States with respect to the group, and 
introduces the foreign fighter phenomenon. It also presents the various plans that 
different States have either proposed or are currently debating to address this 
problem. Section III outlines the international human rights regime surrounding 
the right to a nationality. Section IV analyzes the various plans of several States 
proposing to revoke the citizenship of suspected terrorists in light of existing 
international law. Section V addresses some of the normative aspects of these 
plans and other related legal issues. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
A.  The Rise of ISIL 
ISIL is a Salafi21 jihadist group, primarily centered in Iraq and Syria, which 
emerged in 1999 under another name—Jama’at Tawhid wa al-Jihad22—under the 
leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.23 For many years, the group had existed as 
an al-Qaeda affiliate in the region.24 Before 2003, the group was predominantly 
involved with training Salafi terrorists across the region.25 The group, even in these 
                                                 
21  Salafism is a conservative reform movement within Sunni Islam that focuses on emulating the 
example and teachings of the Prophet Muhammed and his early followers. It requires a strict and 
literal interpretation of sharia law. For a discussion of Salafism and ISIL, see Joas Wagemakers, 
Jihadi-Salafi views of the Islamic State, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/27/jihadi-salafi-views-of-
the-islamic-state/. 
22  What is 'Islamic State'?, BBC (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
29052144. The name of the organization roughly translates to “The Organization of Monotheism 
and Jihad.” 
23  There was a mutual distrust between al-Zarqawi and Bin Laden in the early 2000s. While there was 
a “marriage of convenience” between Jama’at Tawhid wa al-Jihad and al-Qaeda, the groups had 
different backgrounds, goals, and leadership styles. See Aaron Y. Zelin, Research Notes: The War 
between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (June 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ 
Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf. 
24  Id. 
25  Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, STANFORD UNIVERSITY MAPPING MILITANTS 
PROJECT, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1 (last updated 
May 15, 2015). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 184 Vol. 17 No. 1 
early years, drew foreign fighters from Jordan, Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 
among other countries.26 Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the group 
reorganized itself as an official al-Qaeda affiliate based in Iraq.27 It was actively 
involved in an armed insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi 
military.28 During this period, the group was significantly weakened by U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts and its rejection by many local Sunni tribesmen and al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), who felt that the group’s tactics and measures were too 
extreme.29 In 2006, the group reorganized under the name the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI).30 
At the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, ISI, led by Ibrahim Awad 
Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai,31 sent material support and delegates to various anti-
government rebel groups. ISI supporters began actively fighting the Assad 
government in conjunction with al-Nusra, another al-Qaeda affiliate, and other 
rebels.32 In April 2013, ISI announced a merger with al-Nusra and also announced 
that ISI would thereafter be known as ISIL.33 This merger between ISIL, al-Nusra, 
and al-Qaeda eventually failed after the leadership of both al-Nusra and al-Qaeda 
rejected the organization.34 ISIL was formally cut off from al-Qaeda and al-Nusra 
in February 2014.35 In the aftermath of the failed merger, the group continued its 
attacks against the Syrian government and certain rebel groups.36 
In 2014, ISIL initiated increasingly aggressive military operations in Iraq and 
drove Iraqi government forces out of key cities in the northern and western 
regions of the country.37 Specifically, in January 2014, ISIL fighters pushed the 
Iraqi military out of Fallujah.38 In March 2014, ISIL seized Mosul.39 Currently, the 
                                                 
26  Id. 
27  What is 'Islamic State'?, supra note 22. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, supra note 25. 
31  He is more commonly known by his nom de guerre, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” See id. 
32  The State of the War Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/ 
world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html (last updated Oct. 22, 
2015). 
33  Id. 
34  See Zelin, supra note 23. 
35  See What is 'Islamic State'?, supra note 22. 
36  See Zelin, supra note 23. 
37  Id. 
38  See Martin Chulov et al., Iraq army capitulates to Isis militants in four cities, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states. 
39  Id. 
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group controls a wide swath of territory across Syria and Iraq.40 In 2014, the 
Central Intelligence Agency estimated the group had a strength of between 20,000 
to 31,000 fighters.41 Other projections, however, place the number much higher—
the Russian military believes that ISIL can muster around 70,000 fighters,42 while 
the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has estimated that in Syria alone, ISIL 
fighters number over 50,000.43 
The group is noted for its strategic use of social media to facilitate 
recruitment and convey its radical ideology to a broader and increasingly global 
audience.44 Through social media, ISIL has been able to seek recruits from many 
countries throughout the Middle East, in addition to Western nations.45 The 
online content often depicts the graphic and brutal atrocities committed by 
fighters against civilians, journalists, and Iraqi government forces.46 
ISIL is perpetrating numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
the territory it has occupied. According to a recent report from the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, there are mass attacks targeting certain ethnic 
and religious minorities, including “Yezidis, Christians, Turkmen, Sabea-
Mandeans, Kaka’e, Kurds and Shi’a.”47 These attacks are arguably genocidal in 
nature, such as the massacre of the Yezidi community in Sinjar.48 Moreover, ISIL 
                                                 
40  The State of the War Against ISIS, supra note 32. 
41  Jim Sciutto et al., ISIS can 'muster' between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters, CIA says, CNN (Sept. 12, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/. 
42  Islamic State formations comprise up to 70,000 gunmen — Chief of Russia’s General Staff, TASS: RUSSIAN 
NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 10, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/world/766237. 
43  Islamic State ‘has 50,000 fighters in Syria’, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-50000-fighters-syria-
2014819184258421392.html. 
44  See J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of 
ISIS supporters on Twitter, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. 
RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD (Mar. 2015); see also Mark Mazzetti & Michael R. Gordon, 
ISIS Is Winning The Social Media War, U.S. Concludes, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/middleeast/isis-is-winning-message-war-us-
concludes.html.  
45  See Mazzetti & Gordon, supra note 44. 
46  See, for example, id.; Rod Nordland & Alissa J. Rubin, Massacre Claim Shakes Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (June 
15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0. 
47  Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in the light 
of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups, 
Human Rights Council, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/18, (Mar. 13, 2015). 
48  Mohammed A. Salih & Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Iraqi Yazidis: 'If we move they will kill us', AL 
JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/iraqi-yazidis-if-
move-they-will-kill-us-20148513656188206.html. In March 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry 
declared ISIL’s atrocities against Christians, Yazidis, and Shi’a to be a “genocide.” See Matthew 
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fighters are committing mass rape, forcing women into sexual slavery, and 
allowing and encouraging other acts of sexual violence by the group’s fighters.49 
ISIL fighters are attacking religious and historical monuments and destroying and 
seizing civilian property.50 The group is committing numerous war crimes, 
including summary executions of political opponents, forcible conversions, 
torture, child conscription, displacement of civilian populations, and slavery, 
among others.51 
As of 2016, fighting remains fierce in the region and the future of the conflict 
is uncertain. While other radical terrorist groups have declared their allegiance to 
ISIL, including Nigeria’s Boko Haram,52 U.S. airstrikes in the region have dealt 
heavy losses to ISIL.53 Moreover, the Iraqi military and Kurdish forces have staged 
numerous counteroffensives to reclaim territory previously held by ISIL.54 Russia 
has also pledged greater material support to the Assad government in Syria and is 
assisting the Syrian government in countering rebel groups, including ISIL.55 
Despite the increased military activity by major foreign powers, ISIL still retains a 
large number of fighters in Syria and Iraq and controls a significant amount of 
territory.56 It is unclear how continued counterterrorism efforts by the U.S. and 
Iraq and greater foreign intervention in the region will impact ISIL. 
                                                 
Rosenberg, Citing Atrocities, John Kerry Calls ISIS Actions Genocide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/world/middleeast/citing-atrocities-john-kerry-calls-isis-
actions-genocide.html. 
49  See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 47. 
50  See id. 
51  Id. 
52  ISIL ‘accepts Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance’, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 12, 2015 22:03 GMT), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko-haram-pledge-allegiance-
150312201038730.html. 
53  Kathy Gilsinan, Counting the ISIS Dead, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/international/archive/2015/10/us-isis-fighters-killed/410599/. 
54  See Karen Leigh & Matt Bradley, Counteroffensive in Iraq to Push Back Islamic State Planned for 2015, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 30, 2014 3:41 p.m. ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
counteroffensive-in-iraq-to-push-back-islamic-state-planned-for-2015-1419972094. 
55  Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015 16:59 GMT), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-150930133155190 
.html. 
56  Id. ISIL also recently declared itself to be the “Islamic Caliphate.” For a discussion of this 
declaration’s implications, see Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC 
WORLD, at 31–35 (Mar. 2015). 
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B.  The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon 
As previously discussed, ISIL has a long history of drawing upon foreign 
fighters. I define “foreign fighter” as an individual who possesses a nationality or 
nationalities that are not Syrian or Iraqi. Ever since the creation of Jama’at Tawhid 
wa al-Jihad, which itself had numerous fighters from across the Middle East, 
Central Asia, and South Asia, ISIL has had success in recruiting and retaining 
foreign fighters from across the world.57 There are competing accounts as to why 
ISIL can do this effectively.58 For example, one explanation attributes the high 
number of foreign fighters to the relatively porous border between Turkey and 
Syria, making it easier for foreign fighters to travel to Syria.59 
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ICSR) estimates that approximately 20,000 foreign fighters have joined 
ISIL.60 According to the ICSR, this estimate surpasses the total number of foreign 
fighters that fought the Soviet Union alongside the Afghani mujahedeen during the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.61 ICSR estimates that some 4,000 
of these fighters are from Western Europe and roughly 100 are from the U.S., 100 
from Canada, and 100-250 from Australia.62 There are also 1,500-2,500 Saudi 
Arabian fighters, 1,500-3,000 Tunisians, 1,500 Moroccans, 1,500 Jordanians, 800 
Lebanese, and 600 Turks.63 Similar estimates have been reported by other 
organizations.64 
Not only are the raw numbers startling, but the relatively high number from 
Western Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Australia are particularly striking. This 
poses a very real security challenge for these States. One concern is that these 
                                                 
57  Eric Schmitt & Somini Sengupta, Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-
to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?_r=0; Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, supra 
note 25. 
58  See Simon Cottee, Pilgrims to the Islamic State, THE ATLANTIC (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/isis-foreign-fighters-political-
pilgrims/399209/; Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, supra note 9. 
59  Id. 
60  Peter R. Neumann, Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in 
the 1980s, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-
20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ [hereinafter ICSR]. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  These numbers are “conflict totals,” which estimate the total number of foreign fighters that have 
joined ISIL. ICSR estimates that between 5 to 10% of these foreigners have already died and that 
10 to 30% of these individuals have left the conflict. See id. 
64  Id. 
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foreign fighters hold the passport of their home country and generally have the 
right to return to their home state. A foreign fighter could conceivably travel to 
Iraq or Syria, join ISIL, receive weapons and explosives training, and then travel 
back to his home country. At home, he might recruit for ISIL or commit other 
acts of terrorism.65 
There is a concern that foreign fighters may travel to other countries with 
greater ease. Being a citizen of an E.U. Member State, for example, makes travel 
within the E.U. easier. A U.K. intelligence agency must not only monitor an 
individual’s travel between the U.K. and Syria or Iraq, but also between countries 
that are parties to the Schengen Agreement66 and Syria and Iraq.67 
C. Counterterrorism Responses 
Given the large number of foreign fighters joining ISIL, States have adopted 
a variety of counterterrorism responses. While U.S. airstrikes in Syria have targeted 
ISIL foreign fighters,68 domestically, law enforcement and intelligence services are 
focused on trying to apprehend and charge suspects either before they leave to 
fight for ISIL or upon their reentry. In the U.S., for example, many individuals 
who were suspected of trying to leave the country to fight for ISIL in Syria were 
arrested and charged under domestic antiterrorism laws.69 Some States, such as 
France, are using court orders to prevent suspected ISIL sympathizers from 
leaving the country.70 Though challenging, others have focused on monitoring 
suspected ISIL fighters if they are not immediately arrested.71 
Numerous States, however, are trying to prevent foreign fighters from even 
reentering their home countries as part of their counterterrorism strategy. The 
German government, for example, proposed revoking the passports of foreign 
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fighters to make international travel more difficult.72 States like the U.K. and 
Canada have already implemented new citizenship laws that allow their 
governments to revoke the citizenship of dual-nationals who are suspected ISIL 
foreign fighters.73 Other States, such as Australia and Norway, are contemplating 
plans to strip the citizenship of ISIL foreign fighters even if doing so would render 
individuals stateless.74 Australia has even proposed revoking the nationality of 
close family members of suspected fighters, such as their children.75 
Instituting these plans will implicate significant international legal issues. An 
important tenet in international human rights law concerns the right to return to 
one’s home country.76 Germany’s plan to revoke passports of suspected ISIL 
fighters, for example, might be in violation of the state’s obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).77 Similarly, States 
contemplating revoking the nationality of ISIL foreign fighters might encounter 
international legal obstacles by virtue of various international human rights treaties 
to which they are party. The following Section will discuss the current 
international legal regime surrounding the right to nationality. It will broadly 
separate these plans into three categories: laws that might deprive a dual-national 
of one of his nationalities; plans to strip a suspected ISIL fighter of his sole 
nationality, rendering that person stateless; and plans to revoke the nationality of 
close family members of the suspected foreign fighter, such as his children. 
III.  THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME  
The right to one’s nationality is, in some respects, one of the most important 
aspects of the emerging field of international human rights law. Hannah Arendt 
observed that the most basic political and civil rights flow through one’s 
citizenship.78 Arendt drew a sharp distinction between human rights—universal 
rights that are supposedly possessed by an individual simply by virtue of being 
human—and civil rights.79 An individual holds these latter rights by virtue of the 
fact that he belongs to a distinct political community that is willing to enforce 
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77  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-
20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
78  HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 277 (1951). 
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those rights.80 Statelessness effectively causes one to lose all rights other than those 
generally recognized in international law as basic human rights.81 States are 
generally unwilling to secure and protect the civil rights of refugees and the 
stateless.82 Noting that the state is ultimately the highest political entity in an 
anarchic international system, Arendt argued that States have little incentive to 
respect and enforce the human rights of the stateless and others when these rights 
conflict with the States’ overall national interests.83 
Indeed, many States predicate numerous political, civil, economic, and social 
rights on citizenship. Therefore, to Arendt, possessing a nationality is akin to 
having the right to rights.84 This begs the question: given the importance of 
nationality under Arendt’s analytical framework, what is the state’s power to grant 
or revoke nationality? Is it simply an aspect of traditional state sovereignty? Or 
have recent developments in international law narrowed the traditionally broad 
power of States in this arena? 
A critical tenet of international law in the Westphalian system85 is the 
principle of state sovereignty—the idea that States have the sole ability to regulate 
and manage their own domestic and international affairs, free from the 
interference of other States.86 Nationality—and the conditions under which it is 
to be granted or revoked—was traditionally outside the sphere of international 
law so long as it did not interfere with the rights of other States.87 The growth of 
the international human rights regime, and the willingness of States to be bound 
by human rights treaties, have changed this traditional understanding of 
nationality and the power of States to grant and revoke it.88 
In the aftermath of World War II and the emerging international human 
rights consciousness that flourished in the post-war era, numerous international 
conventions were enacted that created a right to nationality under international 
law. Several key instruments, including the UDHR, the 1961 Convention, and the 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others, have codified this right. 
Consequently, these treaties have placed additional restrictions on States that seek 
to deprive an individual of his or her nationality.89 The goal behind these 
instruments is to reduce the incidence of statelessness and promote the 
development of human rights across the globe. This Comment will proceed to 
examine several of the most important conventions that deal with nationality. 
A.  Universal  Declaration of Human Rights  
The UDHR was drafted and ratified after World War II and was one of the 
first major post-war instruments regarding individual human rights.90 It was 
instrumental in defining the fundamental freedoms and human rights referenced 
in the U.N. Charter and is a constitutive document of the U.N. These rights apply 
to all persons, regardless of race, sex, religion, national origin, or citizenship status. 
The UDHR is frequently cited and discussed by governments, lawyers, 
constitutional courts, and many in the legal, policy, and academic communities. It 
is a profoundly important source of international human rights law. Some even 
argue that its provisions have the status of customary international law.91 
Article 15 of the UDHR explicitly creates a right to nationality under 
international law.92 This Article was drafted in response to the massive de-
nationalizations that occurred during World War II and in its aftermath.93 
Specifically, it states: “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.”94 Article 15, like much of the UDHR, articulates a general principle 
of international law without elaborating upon the specific contours of the right to 
nationality. It states that every person is entitled to a nationality, but does not 
explicitly specify whether the state in which a person resides owes a duty, under 
international law, to provide that person with a nationality.95 
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Section 2 of Article 15 prohibits States from depriving an individual of his 
nationality “arbitrarily.”96 This seems to suggest that at least procedurally,97 there 
must be some rationale for revocation or perhaps even judicial “due process” 
given to an individual before a state revokes his or her nationality. But there is a 
conflict within Article 15—Section 2 implicitly contemplates a situation in which 
a state may revoke the citizenship of an individual which might render an 
individual without a nationality.98 Should he be unable to acquire another 
nationality, a violation of Section 1 would result. It is also unclear which state must 
provide this nationality to an individual. 
The term “arbitrarily” might confer some substantive rights to individuals. 
In interpreting what constitutes “arbitrary” state action in the context of 
international law, existing authority suggests that “necessity, proportionality, and 
reasonableness are relevant to the inquiry.”99 The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
(HCR) has stated, in discussing the ICCPR, that “the introduction of the concept 
of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law 
should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the [ICCPR] 
and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”100 The 
HCR has further noted that “the notion of ‘arbitrariness’ must not be equated 
with ‘against the law’ but must be interpreted more broadly to include such 
elements as inappropriateness and injustice.”101 Though the HCR is providing 
guidance on the meaning of “arbitrary” in the ICCPR, this interpretation is useful 
in understanding what “arbitrary” means in the UDHR. The ICCPR was created 
to elaborate upon and implement the rights in the UDHR, and the HCR’s 
interpretation of key terms in the ICCPR is therefore valuable in construing the 
language of the UDHR. 
International law also explicitly recognizes several legitimate grounds for the 
revocation of nationality, which include fraud in obtaining citizenship, acts of 
disloyalty, and prejudicial conduct toward the granting state.102 These valid reasons 
for the revocation of citizenship and the ban on “arbitrary” deprivations imply 
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that nationality cannot be revoked for reasons not specifically provided for under 
customary international law or by relevant treaties. Other reasons for revocation, 
such as a state revoking an individual’s nationality solely on the basis of his or her 
race or ethnicity, seem to be “arbitrary” and impermissible under the UDHR.103 
Article 2 explicitly prohibits discrimination on this basis, which is also echoed in 
Article 9 of the 1961 Convention.104 Suppose, for example, racial discrimination is 
grounds for revoking an individual’s nationality under domestic law in a particular 
state. Even if the state afforded adequate due process to an individual before 
stripping his nationality on account of his race, the substantive aspect of Article 
15(2) would prohibit such a revocation as “arbitrary” state action.105 
Thus, whether Article 15(2) creates a procedural safeguard and simply defers 
to underlying domestic law or confers any substantive protections is important in 
the context of an international right to citizenship. If Article 15(2) provides a 
substantive right by permitting the revocation of citizenship only for reasons 
already recognized by existing international law, it will curtail state discretion over 
citizenship law. Such a substantive protection might prohibit state plans to strip 
suspected terrorists of their nationality. If, however, it is simply a procedural 
requirement, this could be more favorable to States that have set up tribunals or 
some other mechanism for the purpose of revoking citizenship. Even if Article 
15(2) created a mere procedural safeguard, there is a question as to the efficacy 
and actual opportunity of an individual, who is abroad, to challenge this action 
before a domestic body.106 
B.  1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness  
The 1961 Convention is a major source of international law on citizenship 
and the rights of stateless peoples.107 It was created to reduce the incidence of 
statelessness in the aftermath of World War II and further implement the broad 
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provisions of Article 15 of the UDHR.108 It broadly codifies many existing 
principles of customary international law while adding some restrictions on the 
ability of States to strip the nationality of individuals. Under the 1961 Convention, 
States retain ultimate sovereignty over the decision to grant citizenship.109 The 
Convention also creates numerous individual rights and restricts the ways in which 
States may revoke nationality.110 It also addresses other issues in nationality law, 
such as the acquisition of citizenship while aboard an aircraft or sea vessel, 
residency requirements, and the time in which an individual may assert his or her 
rights under the Convention.111 
Sixty-four countries have ratified the 1961 Convention.112 Of the countries 
discussed in this Comment, the U.S. has neither signed the treaty, nor ratified it.113 
France has signed it, but is yet to formally ratify.114 Australia, Canada, the U.K., 
Norway, and Germany are all States Party to the Convention.115 Several States that 
are signatories have made declarations and/or reservations upon accession.116 
Certain provisions of the 1961 Convention expressly prohibit a contracting 
state from stripping an individual of his citizenship if doing so would render him 
stateless. Specifically, Article 6 states that if a law causes a child or spouse to lose 
his nationality by virtue of a parent or spouse losing his nationality, such a loss is 
conditional upon that individual acquiring another nationality.117 Article 7 says that 
laws allowing the renunciation of one’s citizenship do not actually result in the 
loss of one’s nationality until the nationality of another state has been acquired by 
that individual.118 
Article 8, however, is most relevant to this Comment. It contains certain 
exceptions to the protections of the Convention in the instance of fraud, 
disloyalty, or prejudicial conduct towards the state where an individual holds his 
nationality.119 If an individual acquires his nationality through fraud, then a state 
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may revoke his citizenship whether or not doing so would render him stateless. 
Moreover, if at the time of signing, a state announced its intention to retain laws 
that would strip the nationality of those who commit acts prejudicial to “vital 
national interests” or swear allegiance to a foreign state, these laws remain valid.120 
There must, however, be an opportunity for the individual to present a defense at 
a fair hearing.121 
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued 
a report interpreting key sections of Article 8.122 Most notably, it provided 
guidance on the meaning of Article 8(3)(a)(ii), which says that notwithstanding the 
protections of Article 8(1), an individual may be stripped of his nationality such 
that he becomes stateless if he “has conducted himself in a manner seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”123 The report suggests that this is an 
extremely high threshold that must “threaten the foundations and organizations 
of the State,” and not merely implicate “national interests.”124 It declares that 
ordinary criminal activity does not rise to the level of “vital national interests” 
covered by the Article.125 Rather, for a state to invoke Article 8, a more serious 
crime must be at issue which is highly prejudicial towards the state—this includes 
espionage, treason, or a violation of the duty of loyalty owed to one’s state.126 
Interestingly, the report states that “depending on their interpretation in domestic 
law—‘terrorist acts’ may be considered to fall within the scope of this 
paragraph.”127 This phrasing, however, suggests that certain terrorist actions may 
not fall within the scope of Article 8. Given the language of the exception, a court 
might have to consider whether terrorism committed abroad sufficiently 
implicates the “vital interests” of the state. 
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C. Other Sources of International Treaty Law 
The right to nationality is also discussed in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC),128 the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW),129 and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 
(CNMW).130 These conventions afford children and women certain enhanced 
protections under international law. They are relevant to this Comment as some 
States are contemplating plans to strip not only a suspected male terrorist of his 
nationality, but potentially his spouse or children as well.131 
The CRC sets out various, political, economic, social, cultural, and health 
rights of children.132 Article 7 of this Convention makes nationality a fundamental 
right of the child, stating that the “child . . . shall have the right . . . to acquire a 
nationality.”133 Article 8 imposes an obligation on the States Party to protect a 
child’s right to his or her identity, including nationality.134 While this Convention 
does not further define the scope of this obligation, the treaty was created with 
the intent of strengthening legal protections for children under international law. 
Therefore, in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention), we must construe these protections broadly to protect the interests 
of children in keeping with the Convention’s “object and purpose.”135 
CEDAW and the CNMW were adopted in 1979 and 1957, respectively.136 
These treaties were created to end sex discrimination and improve the conditions 
of women. With respect to citizenship rights, Article 9 of CEDAW grants women 
rights equal to those of men in acquiring, maintaining, or changing their 
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nationality.137 Article 9 also grants them equal rights to their children with respect 
to nationality.138 CEDAW, along with the CNMW, also prohibits women from 
losing their nationality because of a change in their spouse’s status139 or 
nationality.140 
Interestingly, these same protections are not explicitly available to men. 
There have been known female ISIL foreign fighters.141 Their husbands will be 
unable to invoke these protections which forbid changes to their nationality based 
on a change to their wives’ status. At the same time, taking into account the general 
principle of equality articulated by these treaties and their object and purpose, 
there is a strong argument that a male spouse of a suspected ISIL foreign fighter 
could invoke similar protections under these treaties.142 Similarly, CEDAW gives 
a woman equal nationality rights to her children.143 If one was to interpret the 
nationality rights in the CRC broadly and in a way that prohibits a state from 
revoking a child’s nationality, reading these two conventions together might yield 
a situation where women foreign fighters are afforded the same protections under 
international law. 
Other sources of treaty law also govern the right to one’s nationality, 
including the European Convention on Nationality,144 which states that “A) 
everyone has the right to a nationality; B) statelessness shall be avoided; [and] C) 
no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality.” This language closely 
tracks the 1961 Convention.145 
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IV.  LEGAL OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The timing of proposals to revoke the nationality of suspected terrorists 
overlaps with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’ effort to end 
statelessness by 2024.146 Moreover, in the wake of the devastating attacks in Paris, 
San Bernardino, Beirut, and others in 2015, many in the international community 
are paying close attention to the counterterrorism efforts against ISIL. Russia, the 
U.S., and France have increased military operations in Syria in response to the 
aforementioned attacks.147 Increasingly, political discourse in many Western 
nations has been concentrating on topics such as immigration, domestic security, 
and the potential security implications of ISIL foreign fighters returning to their 
home countries.148 
This Comment divides the denationalization plans into three categories: 
plans to revoke the nationality of dual citizens, plans to revoke the nationality of 
individuals with only one citizenship, and plans to revoke the nationality of 
associates of suspected foreign fighters. Section IV.A. argues that while there is 
no outright ban on revoking the nationality of dual nationals, there are, at the very 
least, procedural obligations that States must carefully consider. Section IV.B. 
suggests that international law permits States to deprive individuals of their sole 
nationality, so long as the requirements of the 1961 Convention are satisfied. 
Finally, Section IV.C. contends that States may not revoke the citizenship of 
associates of foreign fighters unless there is an independent basis for doing so 
under international law. 
A.  Proposals to Revoke the Nationality of Dual Citizens  
As previously discussed, some States have already passed legislation 
authorizing the government to revoke the nationality of dual citizens. Canada, for 
example, recently enacted Bill C-24.149 Under this law, a dual citizen’s Canadian 
citizenship could be revoked if he is convicted of espionage, terrorism, or a similar 
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offense.150 Moreover, if he is convicted of a similar foreign equivalent and 
sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison, the government, at its discretion, 
may revoke his nationality.151 The ultimate decision as to whether nationality will 
be revoked rests with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration or his delegate 
instead of an immigration judge.152 This has alarmed human rights advocates and 
lawyers in Canada who argue that Bill C-24 violates due process.153 Moreover, 
many argue that a foreign equivalent of terrorism is defined too broadly—in some 
States, terrorism is often a trumped up charge used to jail political opponents of 
the regime.154 A recent publication of the Canadian Bar Association made 
reference to the fact that Nelson Mandela was convicted of an offense in South 
Africa, which could be considered an equivalent to a Canadian terrorism offense 
punishable under this new citizenship law.155 
In the aftermath of the 2006 London bombings, the U.K. enacted legislation 
which allows it to strip the citizenship of dual citizens.156 These laws were amended 
in 2014 to allow the government to withdraw the citizenship of U.K. nationals 
with only one nationality.157 If the Home Secretary finds that an individual 
committed acts of terrorism or espionage, then he may revoke that person’s 
citizenship without a hearing.158 The suspect has slightly under a month to contest 
this finding before a special immigration judge.159 
1. Arguments in support of these plans. 
Several legal arguments support the position that States may revoke the 
citizenship of dual nationals. First, the UDHR does not elaborate on the legal 
obligations of state with respect to preserving the nationality of its citizens. It also 
contemplates situations in which States may revoke nationality. Given the lack of 
clarity in this area of international law and the fact that nationality has traditionally 
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been an area where deference is given to States, these denationalization policies 
are legal under international law. This Section will further discuss these arguments. 
While Article 15 of the UDHR makes nationality a right and prohibits its 
arbitrary revocation, it does not further elaborate on the status of dual nationals 
under international law.160 Article 15 does not explicitly require States to grant or 
protect citizenship in any particular way. In fact, Article 15(2) of the UDHR 
implicitly contemplates situations in which a state might revoke an individual’s 
nationality, as it prohibits only arbitrary revocations as opposed to all 
revocations.161 Additionally, the UDHR says nothing about an individual having a 
right to all of his nationalities, nor does it explicitly elaborate on what it means to 
have one’s nationality “arbitrarily” revoked. The UDHR does not suggest which 
state, if any, must provide a nationality to an individual or afford him the right to 
retain his current citizenship. Instead, the UDHR defers these decisions to the 
States Party. “Arbitrary” does not necessarily mean that States must afford due 
process to an individual—rather, it arguably means that some rationale or reason 
must be proffered by the government in making the decision to revoke an 
individual’s nationality.162 
The 1961 Convention also does not appear to prohibit stripping the 
citizenship of dual nationals. Article 8(1) explicitly covers individuals who are at 
risk of becoming stateless.163 A dual national would have the nationality of another 
state and would therefore not be at risk of statelessness. Canada’s Bill C-24, for 
example, clearly distinguishes between Canadians who possess only Canadian 
citizenship and those who do not.164 A simple expressio unius reading of the 1961 
Convention clearly excludes dual nationals from its protections. Therefore, any 
implied substantive protections in Article 15(2) of the UDHR derived through the 
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explicit prohibitions in Article 8 of the 1961 Convention should not apply to dual 
citizens. 
Since there are no particular sources of treaty or customary law expressly 
barring States from ever revoking the citizenship of an individual, domestic law 
might govern in the absence or uncertainty of international law in this area.165 
Because nationality law has been a part of States’ traditional sphere of sovereignty, 
the vagueness of the UDHR with respect to dual nationals suggests that States 
have some latitude in this area. Moreover, many other provisions of the UDHR 
are ultimately up to States Party to enforce through domestic means. Here, States 
are interpreting their obligations under these treaties and crafting appropriate 
legislation. Canada has interpreted its obligations under the 1961 Convention and 
distinguished between dual nationals and individuals with only Canadian 
citizenship in its nationality law.166 The U.K. acceded to the treaty with a specific 
reservation concerning the power to denationalize citizens in the event they act 
prejudicially towards vital national interests.167 
Finally, States are not engaging in the mass denationalizations that the 
UDHR and the 1961 Convention were created to address.168 Instead, individual 
States, in response to a legitimate and overriding security interest, have introduced 
these citizenship laws as part of their counterterrorism strategies and have used 
them appropriately. Following the London attacks, for example, the U.K. 
government invoked this power intermittently and in response to grave terrorist 
attacks—forty-two times since 2006.169 
2. Arguments against these plans. 
There are strong arguments against denationalization plans. Article 15, at the 
very least, provides individuals with a procedural right. Existing policies, from 
countries like the U.K. and Canada, are deficient insofar as they do not allow 
defendants an opportunity to meaningfully contest the revocation of their 
citizenship. Finally, an untenable result might occur—if two States attempt to 
denationalize an individual concurrently, there could be a “race” between the 
States to revoke, which will have negative implications on international politics 
and law. 
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First, Article 15(2) of the UDHR clearly prohibits “arbitrary” revocations, 
which, at the very least, provides some procedural safeguards.170 Some plans to 
revoke the citizenship of dual nationals, such as the Canadian law, would not have 
the issue adjudicated in court.171 Instead, the law defers the decision to an 
immigration official.172 This presents limited options for the affected individual to 
meaningfully contest this decision or present evidence refuting his alleged link to 
terrorist activity. The U.K. law works similarly, passing the decision to the Home 
Office.173 A suspect has a limited time period to appeal the decision to a special 
immigration court.174 
From a procedural standpoint, these existing statutory schemes are fairly 
troubling. Numerous conventions, such as the ICCPR and the UDHR, guarantee 
the individual’s right to access domestic courts.175 Here, a unilateral action taken 
by an executive agency with limited judicial review violates conventional 
understandings of due process. Instead of allowing a suspect to contest his or her 
status, introduce evidence asserting innocence, and meaningfully cross-examine 
the evidence introduced against him, a bureaucrat is making a unilateral decision. 
No insulated and independent body reviews the government’s factual 
determinations, nor is a defendant afforded the right to contest them. Given the 
political rhetoric in the U.S. and Western European nations surrounding 
immigrants, naturalized citizens, and Muslim minorities, there is an 
understandable concern about political actors making these decisions with little 
oversight. The argument against these plans relies on the contention that 
“arbitrary” should be read to require more than simply some rationale given by 
the government agency responsible for immigration—there must be some form 
of judicial due process afforded to a potential suspect. Such an interpretation of 
the term “arbitrary” is consistent across international human rights law and will 
better advance the object and purpose of these treaties.176 Moreover, a hearing 
before an independent tribunal is more likely to limit potential abuses and the 
overbroad application of these laws while minimizing error if courts are holding 
governments accountable and allowing suspects to raise a defense. 
Additionally, if international law prohibits a state from rendering a person 
stateless, there might be an odd effect between two denationalizing States. For 
example, Canada might wish to denationalize a dual citizen. If, however, the 
citizen’s other country of citizenship revokes his nationality before Canada acts, 
                                                 
170  UDHR, supra note 17, art. 15(2). 
171  Bill C-24 (Historical): Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, supra note 149. 
172  Id. 
173  Bennhold, supra note 156. 
174  Id. 
175  See, for example, ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 14. 
176  See, for example, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 122. 
International Terrorism and Statelessness Jayaraman 
Summer 2016 203 
his Canadian citizenship will be protected under C-24. Therefore, Canada and the 
other state are in a potential “race” to denationalize an individual. If both States 
are signatories to the 1961 Convention—both States would have obligations to 
prevent the individual from becoming stateless. 
A “race” to denationalize is a bizarre and unworkable result. It is effectively 
a regime in which States have an incentive to quickly denationalize a suspect and 
race against other States to be first. This might lead to situations in which States 
quickly revoke citizenship of suspects and potentially making mistakes. Moreover, 
this could lead to tension between States which are trying to denationalize the 
same individual—a state’s counterintelligence apparatus has less incentive to share 
information with the other state if doing so would lead it to denationalize first. 
Moreover, a “race” to denationalize might lead to States simply ignoring or 
refusing to enforce provisions of the 1961 Convention—States may ignore their 
obligations under the treaty if they “lose” the “race” to another state. 
3. Conclusion and related issues. 
Ultimately, when balancing the legal arguments for and against these plans, 
it appears there is no per se ban on revoking the citizenship of dual citizens. The 
1961 Convention’s protections extend only to a person who is at risk of 
statelessness. Moreover, there is a strong argument that a suspected ISIL foreign 
fighter, simply by virtue of declaring his allegiance to ISIL, meets an existing 
exception to the 1961 Convention if the revocation of his nationality were to 
render him stateless. Additionally, the UDHR implicitly recognizes that 
revocations of nationality may occur. The UDHR does not make it incumbent on 
any particular state to grant nationality to a particular individual. Finally, 
nationality law is an area where States have been afforded great deference as part 
of their traditional sphere of sovereignty.177 Given the uncertainty of international 
law in this area, there is a compelling argument to defer to the security interests of 
States in implementing such plans. 
At the same time, there is a right against “arbitrary” revocations, and there 
are troubling procedural issues with Canada’s and the U.K.’s laws. The lack of 
procedural rights does not appear to be fatal, however, as States can amend these 
laws to afford greater procedural safeguards and provide for additional review by 
an independent tribunal. At the same time, there is a question of an individual’s 
ability to actually contest his or her status even with procedural safeguards in place. 
If an individual is abroad, and his citizenship is under review, what is his actual 
ability to raise an adequate defense if he is not present in the home country and 
cannot respond to the summons or complaint? Without an opportunity to 
meaningfully contest the disposition of one’s citizenship, there might be a 
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violation of Article 15(2) of the UDHR.178 States must consider this issue carefully 
when designing procedural protections for defendants. 
B.  Proposals to Render Individuals Stateless  
Some States have enacted or are considering legislation revoking the 
nationality of suspected foreign fighters with only one nationality, rendering them 
stateless. Norway, for example, is contemplating a plan that would strip a 
suspected terrorist of his citizenship, regardless of whether this would leave him 
stateless.179 This could be a potential “next step” for States that have already 
created plans to strip the citizenship of those who possess dual nationality. As 
previously discussed, after the 2006 London bombings, the U.K. passed legislation 
allowing the Home Office to revoke the U.K. nationality of dual citizens.180 In 
2014, this law was expanded to include individuals with only U.K. citizenship, 
leaving those people stateless.181 
There is a host of new legal issues in the context of rendering an individual 
stateless. First, much of the aforementioned analysis under the UDHR will apply 
here. There is also a potential sovereignty issue—the expelling state is ostensibly 
“forcing” its national elsewhere, potentially violating the receiving state’s 
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sovereignty.182 Most critically, the protections of the 1961 Convention come into 
play here since the suspected foreign fighter would be left stateless. 
Specifically, Article 8(1) of the 1961 Convention will govern here. This 
provision appears to disallow States from stripping suspected terrorists of their 
citizenship if doing so would leave them stateless.183 But there are important 
qualifications and numerous unanswered questions established by the Article 8 
exceptions. One must also look to any relevant declarations or reservations by the 
acceding state, which might limit the scope of its legal obligations under the 
Convention.184 
1. The Article 8 exceptions. 
Article 8 has numerous exceptions to the Convention’s general prohibition 
on denationalizations that would result in statelessness. Article 8(2) says that if an 
individual obtained his nationality by fraud, then a state may strip that individual 
of his citizenship whether or not doing so would render him stateless.185 Article 
8(3)(a)(ii) carves out another exception for an individual who has “conducted 
himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state.”186 
Article 8(3)(b) says if one has given evidence of his determination to repudiate his 
allegiance with the contracting state, that is also sufficient for the revocation of 
citizenship, even if doing so would leave him stateless.187 
2. Acting against state interests. 
These three provisions, however, require existing laws at the time of 
ratification that had denationalization as a potential penalty to have been declared 
by the signatory country. Analyzing the domestic laws of the country is therefore 
important to see if the Article 8 requirements were satisfied at the time of 
ratification. Current anti-terrorism laws may not have been in existence at the time 
that States ratified the Convention.188 Therefore, States Party are violating the 
treaty if they created new antiterrorism laws, after their accession to the treaty, 
that allow for denationalization of foreign fighters. There may be, however, certain 
reservations that States declared at the time of accession. For example, the U.K. 
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only enacted the reforms to its nationality laws in 2014.189 The country included a 
reservation when signing the 1961 Convention that stated that it could revoke the 
nationality of a U.K. national if he acted prejudicially toward national interests, 
regardless of the rules in Article 8(3).190 This reservation limits the scope of the 
protections afforded to U.K. nationals under the treaty and allows the U.K. to 
denationalize under new authorizing laws if the individual has acted contrarily to 
vital national interests.191 
The current standard in Article 8(3)(a)(ii) is, however, somewhat unclear—
what does it mean to act “in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
the state”?192 One might think of domestic terrorism, for example, as seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of the state. Does this, however, cover acts of 
terrorism abroad? The U.N. has provided some guidance on this question—a 
memorandum from the UNHCR suggests this section creates a “very high 
threshold” and must “threaten the foundations and organizations of the State.”193 
The memorandum also specifically mentions that “terrorist acts” could fail to 
meet this standard, depending on the nature of those acts and the definition of 
terrorism under domestic law.194 
Moreover, the act must “threaten the foundations and organizations of the 
State.”195 Would an act of terrorism, directed toward another country, satisfy this 
condition? Does any act in support of a group such as ISIL, given its intent to 
attack Western nations, constitute a threat to the “foundations and organizations 
of the state”? As previously discussed, this standard seems to require more than 
simply acting contrary to “state interests.”196 Instead, the act must be contrary to 
“vital state interests.”197 This affects the analysis. Does this mean that the level of 
one’s aid or assistance to a terrorist group is determinative of acting contrary to 
“vital state interests?” Or is any material aid or support to a terrorist organization 
a categorical violation of “vital state interests?” It seems likely that following the 
2015 attacks in Paris, Beirut, San Bernardino, and others, joining or offering 
support to ISIL would constitute action that is highly prejudicial to national state 
interests. Even if a suspected foreign fighter joined ISIL and limited his activities 
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to Syria and Iraq, such actions would still be contrary to state interests as defined 
in the 1961 Convention, as he is providing material support to a group that seeks 
continued attacks upon his home state. 
3. Independent adjudication and due process concerns. 
Moreover, Article 8 requires some due process before citizenship can be 
stripped. The Convention says that a court or an “independent body” must hold 
a hearing.198 This lends itself to a whole host of interpretive questions. Does this 
mean a determination made by the executive or his agents? What does 
“independent” mean? Must this be at least a quasi-judicial body with members 
outside the state’s executive, military, intelligence, or defense circles? 
Suppose this is taken to mean a hearing before a court or other independent 
administrative body—this would be a broader and more comprehensive 
protection than an “arbitrary” deprivation discussed in the UDHR, which does 
not explicitly require a hearing before a judicial body or independent tribunal. At 
the same time, one might wonder what sort of opportunity a suspect would have 
to meaningfully contest any such decision rendered by the state and avail himself 
of judicial process. On the other hand, what is to be done about the state’s security 
interest in promptly stripping the citizenship of a potential terrorist and preventing 
him from returning home—can a state reasonably be required to wait with 
pressing national security concerns? How do we balance these two interests under 
the Convention? Here, there is a similar concern to the application of Article 15 
of the UDHR, and there are no easy answers to these questions. 
C. Proposals to Revoke the Nationality of Individuals Closely 
Associated with Suspected Foreign Fighters  
While no state has amended its nationality laws to denationalize individuals 
closely associated with suspected ISIL foreign fighters, Australia has proposed 
legislation to that effect.199 This raises the question of whether States can 
denationalize an individual simply based on his association with a suspected 
foreign fighter. Much of the analysis from the preceding Sections will apply here, 
including the distinction between dual nationals and individuals possessing only 
one nationality. 
If the individual is a dual national, one might argue that so long as the 
decision is not procedurally “arbitrary,” there is likely no per se ban on revoking 
this individual’s nationality. At the same time, however, if the term “arbitrary” 
conveys substantive protections to individuals, then the exceptions of the 1961 
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Convention would apply.200 A state, therefore, could not revoke the nationality of 
the associate unless he met one of the exceptions listed in Article 8 of the 1961 
Convention.201 If a dual national child, for example, had no participation in his or 
her parent’s alleged terrorism, then any revocation simply based on the child’s 
kinship to the parent is “arbitrary.”202 Therefore, the question of whether Article 
15(2) of the UDHR conveys any substantive protections to individuals also affects 
the analysis of whether States may denationalize associates of suspected ISIL 
foreign fighters.203 
Moreover, given the stringent requirements of the 1961 Convention, if the 
state was planning on stripping the nationality of an associate with only one 
nationality, this would likely constitute a violation of international law under the 
1961 Convention, unless that person met an existing exception.204 These 
protections apply to every person in a signatory country. 
Additionally, there are special international conventions dealing with the 
rights of women and children. In the case of spouses, and women in particular, 
CEDAW and the CNMC protect the nationality of women.205 In particular, these 
conventions expressly establish parity in citizenship rights between women and 
men206 and prohibit changes to the spouse’s citizenship based on changes to the 
husband’s.207 In the case of children, Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC impose a duty 
on States to preserve the identity and nationality of children.208 
In the case of women associates of foreign fighters, we can clearly see that 
international conventions on the rights of women prohibit a change in their 
nationality status based solely on a change in their husband’s status. If, however, 
the alleged fighter was a woman, her husband may not receive the heightened 
protection from these conventions. However, given the object, purpose, and 
principle of equality behind these conventions, there is a strong argument that 
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they should be read to cover male spouses of suspected female foreign fighters as 
well.209 
In the case of children, Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC are also vague with 
respect to the duties of States.210 While the Convention does not prohibit States 
from revoking the nationality of children, the requirement that States must 
preserve and maintain the nationality of children arguably requires something 
greater than simply enjoining States from “arbitrarily” revoking nationality. The 
fact that this Convention elaborates on these rights after the UDHR suggests that 
it provides greater protection to children than what is articulated in Article 15 of 
the UDHR.211 While the actual scope of this obligation is unclear without further 
guidance, a responsibility to “preserve” the nationality of children might even be 
interpreted to mean that States cannot revoke the nationality of children. 
Therefore, stripping the citizenship of family or friends who are not involved 
in the alleged terrorism is suspect and less likely to be legal under international 
law. Without an independent basis through which to revoke nationality, the 
protections in the UDHR, 1961 Convention, and other international conventions 
protect otherwise innocent individuals from denationalization of this type. 
Moreover, from a normative standpoint, there is something rather invidious and 
troubling about revoking the citizenship of a family member of a suspected ISIL 
foreign fighter if that person had nothing to do with the suspect’s terrorist 
activities. 
V.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RELATED LEGAL ISSUES :  
WHY STATES SHOULD NOT IMPLEMENT THESE PLANS  
From a policy standpoint, is it actually desirable to create and execute plans 
to strip suspected terrorists and their family members of their citizenship? On the 
one hand, States have a strong interest in maintaining their sovereignty and 
protecting against security risks. Revoking the nationality of a suspected terrorist 
seems like a relatively easy and low cost method to prevent reentry. It avoids 
potentially thorny legal questions with respect to revoking passports or denying a 
citizen the right to reenter his or her home country, which might be prohibited 
under international law.212 Moreover, monitoring by security or intelligence 
                                                 
209  This is preferred interpretive method under the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, supra note 135, art. 31. 
210  Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 7–8. 
211  UDHR, supra note 17, art. 15(2). 
212  See, for example, id. at art. 13(2) (“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country.”); ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 12 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any 
country, including his own . . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country.”). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 210 Vol. 17 No. 1 
services might be costly or ineffective due to certain constitutional or other legal 
protections.213 An individual might be suspected of being such a high risk that the 
state may not wish to hazard the danger of allowing him or her to reenter the 
country if the individual would not be arrested immediately. Moreover, if States 
revoked nationality, it might be easier for them to target a suspected terrorist in a 
drone strike or similar extra-judicial killing. This would allow States to circumvent 
any protections available to the suspected foreign fighter under domestic law 
which might prevent the targeted assassinations of nationals.214 
On the other hand, there are numerous issues with respect to the actual 
efficacy and legality of these plans. These concerns, and their related consequences 
for state security and international law, suggest that States should be very cautious 
before implementing these plans or should reject them entirely. The Comment 
will outline some of the major issues with implementing these plans and propose 
why it is not in the long-term interests of States, individuals, and the international 
community to allow these plans to come to fruition. 
A.  Ignoring the Underlying Problem 
First, denationalizing effectively allows a state to simply “dump” one of its 
nationals into the conflict in which he or she is operating.215 If the individual 
wishes to leave the conflict and is rendered stateless by one of these proposals, 
the denationalizing state forces that individual back to the terrorist group or into 
a position of breaking the laws of other States—it further disincentivizes him from 
renouncing his participation in a terrorist organization.216 At the very least, it 
increases the individual’s cost of exiting the conflict by leaving him stateless. This 
is because that person might have no choice but to remain engaged with his 
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terrorist group or violate other laws by evading capture and illegally remaining in 
another state.217 
Moreover, the act of denationalizing and “dumping” a national arguably 
violates the sovereignty of States where denationalized terrorists are operating or 
to which they have fled.218 If that individual was rendered stateless, he could not 
legally move across countries. If he resides illegally in another state, this infringes 
upon the national sovereignty and violates the law of the receiving state.219 The 
receiving state can also no longer deport or otherwise remove the stateless person 
to another country without violating international law.220 Thus, the primary 
burden of dealing with a stateless terrorist is left mainly on the shoulders of the 
state in which that person is operating or located. Contrast this situation with a 
state that still claims a suspected fighter as one of its nationals and actively seeks 
to apprehend that person and bring him to justice, asserting universal or 
nationality jurisdiction and criminalizing his actions extraterritorially.221 
While denationalization might be a temporary security solution for an 
individual state, it does not address the broader issues regarding international 
terrorism. Specifically, simply denationalizing a suspected terrorist does nothing 
to actually bring that person to justice—instead, it simply allows a particular state 
to absolve itself of both legal and moral responsibility and jurisdiction over that 
person. Such an action does little to combat terrorist groups such as ISIL or 
impede their activities and recruitment. It might only marginally deter potential 
recruits, who are likely already contemplating lengthy criminal sentences under 
domestic law or the risk of injury or death if they provide material support to a 
terrorist organization.222 If the denationalizing state does nothing to aid or assist 
the receiving state in combating terrorist groups, the strength of the terrorist 
group is not directly diminished. Denationalization of fighters by foreign States 
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will not yield a tangible benefit to the Iraqi or Syrian governments or others 
actively fighting ISIL. The underlying problem is thus simply punted to the 
international community and the States where these individuals are located. 
B.  Legal Obligations to Apprehend and Bring Suspected 
Terrorists to Justice and Related Legal and Ethical 
Concerns 
Moreover, if the state has credible intelligence to suggest that its national is 
a terrorist, it has an obligation (potentially under international law) to pursue and 
apprehend that individual.223 Especially if the state criminalizes acts of terrorism 
extraterritorially, domestic law may impose a duty on the state to bring that person 
to justice.224 One would have to look to applicable domestic law on this subject. 
If, by denying reentry, it makes it more difficult for security services to apprehend 
a suspect, is it not neglecting these legal obligations?225 
If a known terrorist actually wanted to reenter a country, it seems unlikely 
that revoking his nationality would actually serve as an impediment to repatriation. 
If such an individual was flagged as a suspected terrorist, presumably he would be 
stopped and detained by security forces at a border checkpoint. A rational 
individual, seeking to evade detection and capture, might plan to avoid such 
scrutiny by border or customs officials at official border crossings. He might, 
instead, attempt to illegally enter the state. Therefore, the potential risks that 
denationalization policies were created to address would not, in fact, curb the 
return of suspected foreign fighters who are persistent in seeking reentry to the 
former home country. 
While some might argue that denationalization generally makes international 
travel more difficult, the legal issues associated with these plans seems comparable 
to the legal issues regarding the revocations of the passports of individuals and 
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denying nationals the right to travel freely under international law.226 Thus, a more 
narrowly tailored approach might be preferable here from a purely legal 
standpoint, for the aforementioned legal issues with denationalizations.227 
Using denationalization as a punitive or deterrent measure, in the absence of 
actually apprehending a suspected terrorist, is also a poor substitute to convicting 
that person of a substantive terrorism offense. The spate of denationalizations 
carried out by the U.K., for example, has done little in stemming the flow of 
foreign fighters from that country to join ISIL.228 States, instead, should be more 
concerned with locating and jailing suspects for these crimes. 
Moreover, revoking citizenship to facilitate extrajudicial killing is worrisome 
under international human rights law. While the U.S., for example, has increased 
its drone operations and targeted assassinations of key al-Qaeda and ISIL 
fighters,229 the usage of drones and targeted killings is still relatively murky under 
existing international law.230 Therefore, efforts to use denationalization as a tool 
to further extra-judicial killings is potentially problematic under international law. 
There are also a host of ethical issues with extrajudicial killings, which scholars 
have discussed at length in the existing literature.231 
C. Possibi l i ty of Error and Monitoring Capabili ties  
Finally, the possibility of error exists—a state might mistakenly revoke the 
citizenship of an individual who is actually not a terrorist. Revoking the citizenship 
of that individual could have severe, immediate consequences, making it difficult 
for him to challenge this decision in the future. Suppose the U.K. denationalizes 
a suspected terrorist who is actually a civilian. If that person is later detained by 
the security forces of the country in which he is located, he would also be deprived 
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of vital consular services that might make a meaningful difference in navigating a 
foreign legal system.232 He might also have difficulties traveling internationally if 
he does not hold another nationality and passport. If he is rendered stateless, he 
might be “stuck” in the country where he is located. Later, it would likely be 
difficult for that person to contest the revocation of his nationality. 
In the U.K., for example, the individual has only twenty-eight days in which 
to appeal the revocation before a special immigration court.233 By the time he has 
notice of the revocation, starts gathering evidence for his defense, and arranges 
for legal representation, the period might expire. Moreover, lawmakers in the 
U.K., when debating the bill, voiced the concern that individuals who have had 
their nationality revoked would be greatly prejudiced when applying for a 
nationality from another state.234 Indeed, few States, if any, would permit the 
naturalization of a person who lost his prior nationality on account of being a 
suspected terrorist.235 
States could instead monitor individuals who are suspected of terrorism in 
other ways. They might flag their passports at border checkpoints and detain 
suspects at points of entry. There are alternative means, including placing 
individuals on no-fly lists and closely monitoring or arresting suspects upon 
reentry. Denationalization might make it harder for the home state to eventually 
capture and hold accountable a suspected terrorist for these reasons. A suspected 
foreign fighter, having learned of his denationalization, might never attempt to 
return to his home state. Thus, States would simply be increasing the global 
incidence of statelessness without actually achieving any tangible security benefits. 
D.  Balancing the Factors  
Given the mix of related policy and legal considerations for and against these 
proposals, States will have to weigh the security benefits of these programs against 
the potential consequences. There are clear tradeoffs—by limiting an individual’s 
opportunity to reenter the country through denationalization, the state is 
foregoing the opportunity to apprehend the suspect at a point of entry. While it 
might be easier from a legal standpoint to denationalize a suspected foreign fighter 
before a targeted killing, this might violate the state’s responsibilities under 
international law. 
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States should refrain from implementing these plans due to their 
implications on state security and international law. Denationalization plans do 
little in the way of furthering long-term security objectives and do not resolve the 
underlying problems associated with international terrorism. If anything, they 
allow a state to “wash its hands” of one of its nationals, thereby punting the issue 
to the States in which these individuals are operating. The consequences of these 
plans are also in conflict with the sovereignty of the receiving States and could 
conceivably lead to tensions in foreign relations and failure to follow other 
principles of international law. Denationalizations in furtherance of targeted 
killing programs are also of questionable legality under international law, and the 
usage of these plans might undermine state compliance with other areas of 
international law. Additionally, the risk of error and its high costs to individuals 
who are wrongfully stripped of their citizenship should warrant reconsideration 
of these plans. 
Alternatives to denationalization plans, such as travel restrictions and 
revocation of passports, might achieve the same results and have fewer negative 
long-term consequences on state compliance with international human rights law. 
Therefore, this Comment concludes that States should not implement these plans, 
but instead focus on counterterrorism options that will do more to directly curb 
the actions of terrorist groups like ISIL and apprehend suspected members. Other 
solutions should also be carefully scrutinized for their implications on the abilities 
of States to faithfully execute their responsibilities under international law. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment examined some of the international treaty law concerning a 
right to nationality and its implications on plans by States to strip suspected ISIL 
foreign fighters of their nationality. It divided the inquiry into three parts: plans to 
denationalize dual citizens, plans to denationalize individuals with only one 
nationality, and plans to revoke the citizenship of known associates of suspected 
terrorists. The Comment concluded that while there is no outright ban on 
denationalizing dual nationals under international law, there is an “arbitrariness” 
safeguard in existing treaty law. While it is unclear whether this affords individuals 
any substantive rights, it does, at the very least, give suspects a right to challenge 
or contest a determination made about their citizenship. In the case of an 
individual with only one nationality, a state may revoke his citizenship and render 
him stateless only if an existing exception to the 1961 Convention has been met. 
There must be some opportunity to contest the revocation before an independent 
tribunal. In the case of individuals associated with a suspected ISIL foreign fighter 
such as family and friends, international law likely prohibits a revocation of these 
persons’ nationality unless there is an independent basis for revocation. Certain 
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international conventions afford special protection to the nationality rights of 
women and children. 
At the same time, there are normative questions and related legal questions 
that States must answer before implementation. For example, does 
denationalizing a suspect force him back into a conflict and relieve the 
denationalizing state of its responsibility to apprehend a suspected terrorist? Do 
such plans facilitate targeted killing programs, and are such programs permissible 
under international law? The Comment argued that such plans do little in the way 
of furthering counter-terrorism policy objectives and allow States to effectively 
ignore the underlying problem and punt the issue to the international community. 
Moreover, States are disregarding their legal obligations, potentially under 
domestic and international law, to actively seek out and hold suspected foreign 
fighters accountable. Denationalization plans also hurt state compliance with 
international law, and the possibility of error in denationalizing is a very real risk 
with severe consequences. Given the questionable efficacy of these plans and their 
numerous negative ramifications on international law, States should refrain from 
implementing them. 
